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Introduction
Many everyday decisions entail trading off immediate and
delayed outcomes. For instance, we routinely choose between
spending money today, or saving it for later consumption. In such
intertemporal choices, both humans and animals tend to attach
special significance to short-term rewards, a phenomenon known
as ‘‘present bias’’ [1–4]. As a consequence of present bias, people
frequently find it difficult to act in accordance with their own long-
term interest [2,5].
Intertemporal choices in private or professional contexts are
often made under stress; managers, politicians, investment
bankers, medical doctors and other professionals make vital
decisions under a considerable amount of pressure. This applies,
for instance, to a corporate executive who needs to trade-off the
usefulness of long-term business strategies with succumbing to the
pressure of reporting short-term profits, or a medical doctor who
needs to decide on the spot between quick fixes relieving the
symptoms of his patients, or slower but potentially more effective
therapies. How stress affects intertemporal choice, though, is
unknown. Here we combine theory and evidence from behavioral
economics and cellular neuroscience to answer this question.
In behavioral economics, both models and evidence on
intertemporal choice now distinguish between present bias on
the one hand, and impatience on the other [2]. Impatience is
simply the subject’s preference about consumption at different
times (i.e. as soon as possible in case of high impatience) and is not
irrational per se. Present bias is normatively irrational because it
leads subjects to fail executing the future plans they make today
and thereby reverse their preferences in favor of immediate
gratification. For example, when the long term goal is to obtain a
more healthy lifestyle, but you are offered a piece of your favorite
pie now, you might change your preference and choose to eat the
pie. However, when the pie is only available at a later point in
time, you prefer your long-term goal. The application of self-
control is therefore important to overcome present-bias and to
stick to long term preferences, while impatient individuals
consistently prefer more immediate outcomes. Here we econo-
metrically and experimentally distinguish between these two
motives, and can thus ask whether stress differentially affects
present bias or impatience.
In cellular and behavioral neuroscience, it has become evident
in recent years that stress affects neurobiological processes and
cognitive functions in two distinct temporal domains [6–8].
Broadly, the picture that emerges from this research is that
immediately after stress, the stress-induced changes in hormone
and neurotransmitter levels facilitate short-term solutions to the
stressful situation; in contrast, beginning approximately 1 h after
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stress onset, slower physiological changes promote restoration and
future perspective after stress. More specifically, shortly after stress,
corticosteroid hormones and noradrenaline synergistically pro-
mote rapid increases in neuronal activity, such as activity caused
by the neurotransmitter glutamate [9,10], the main excitatory
neurotransmitter in the nervous system. Rapid effects of cortico-
steroids have been described for several emotion- and arousal-
related brain regions such as the hippocampus and amygdala [11].
For instance, in interaction with noradrenergic activation, rapid
corticosteroid actions promote amygdala-dependent processing of
information [11–14] while higher cognitive functions mediated by
e.g. the prefrontal cortex are suppressed [15]. These early
physiological responses to stress likely facilitate the rapid focused
attention, hypervigilance and choice of strategy required to
implement the organism’s fight-or-flight response [6]; in particu-
lar, they promote habitual, reflex-like behavior at the expense of
goal-directed behavior [16], which may lead to impaired
behavioral control.
In contrast, the slow actions of cortisol focus on long-term
restoration and future perspective after stress. Through changes in
gene transcription that require 55–65 minutes to develop and last
for several hours [17], stress-induced corticosteroid actions shut
down the effects of noradrenaline [18–20] and change neuronal
activity in frontal brain regions such that the stress-induced release
of hormones from the pituitary is terminated [21,22]. Behavior-
ally, these delayed effects of stress promote consolidation of stress-
related memories for future use [6,21,23] and stimulate restoration
of cognitive self-control [8,24,25]. Although these slow corticoste-
roid actions develop within an hour, their implications stretch well
beyond this time-domain [14,26].
Based on these previous findings, we hypothesized that this bi-
directional pattern is also apparent in more complex behavioral
responses carried out after stress, such as intertemporal choice.
Thus, we hypothesize that intertemporal choices will be differen-
tially affected immediately after stress versus at a later time point
after stress. More specifically, we predict that immediately after
stress behavioral control may be impaired and subjects would
exhibit an increased propensity to choose smaller-sooner over
larger-later payoffs (i.e. increased present bias), whereas we
predicted the opposite result when subjects were tested at a later
time point after stress.
Materials and Methods
Participants
142 male undergraduate students from the University of Zu¨rich
ranging in age from 19 to 29 (M=21.9764.23) participated in the
study. We restricted our experiment to men since controlling for
ovarian cycle in women is logistically difficult. Subjects were tested
in two batches, spread out by a year. Because all procedures were
the same between the batches and half of the subjects from each
group were tested in different batches, all results were pooled.
Before admission to the study, all subjects were screened in a
telephone interview to exclude medication intake, somatic
diseases, or any neurological or psychiatric disorders. Further-
more, psychology and economics students, self-reported heavy
smokers (consumption of .5 cigarettes per day), heavy alcohol
consumers (consumption of .60 g alcohol per day) and drug users
were excluded. Participants were German native speakers, had not
participated in a Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) before and would
stay in Zu¨rich at least for the next 12 months (for payment of their
reward). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the
Department of Economics at the University of Zu¨rich and all
participants provided written informed consent. Participants
received a variable reimbursement for their participation,
depending on the choices they made during the experiment.
Stress Manipulation
Psychosocial stress was induced with a group version of the
Trier Social Stress Test [27,28] and involved a preparation period
of 5 min, followed by a video- and audio- taped public speaking
task of 12 min (a fictional job interview, see below), and a mental
arithmetic task of 8 min. Both tasks were performed in front of an
evaluation committee (one man and one woman both wearing
white laboratory coats). We used the grouped version of the TSST
(based on the procedure of Dawans et al. [28]) because it is a very
efficient procedure and it elicits comparable stress responses as the
original TSST [28]. Further, the grouped version of the TSST
enabled the use of a control task that optimally controls for the
cognitive load and circumstances of the stress task, as described
Figure 1. Experimental timeline and cortisol and effects of
psychosocial stress on salivary cortisol (A) and alpha-amylase
(B) levels. Subjects were subjected to a group-wise Trier Social Stress
Test (TSST-G) or a control task, which lasted 30 minutes (light gray
region). Subsequently, they performed an intertemporal choice task
lasting approximately 10 min, either immediately following the TSST-G/
Control task (medium gray region), or 20 min later (i.e. 55 min after
onset of the stressful situation; dark grey region). The conducted
ANOVAs revealed a significant Sample Period6 Stress interaction for
both cortisol (A) and alpha-amylase (B). *p,0.1 in post-hoc tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.g001
Stress and Intertemporal Choice
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e78597
T
a
b
le
1
.
D
e
sc
ri
p
ti
ve
s
an
d
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
in
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
p
o
in
ts
in
in
te
rt
e
m
p
o
ra
l
ch
o
ic
e
ta
sk
an
d
d
is
co
u
n
ti
n
g
m
o
d
e
l
fi
t
p
ar
am
e
te
rs
.
T
o
m
.
v
s.
3
m
T
o
m
.
v
s.
6
m
T
o
m
.
v
s.
9
m
T
o
m
.
v
s.
1
2
m
6
m
v
s.
9
m
6
m
v
s.
1
2
m
H
y
p
e
rb
o
li
c
(k
)
E
x
p
o
n
e
n
ti
a
l
(d
e
lt
a
)
Q
u
a
si
-h
y
p
e
rb
o
li
c
(d
e
lt
a
)
Q
u
a
si
-h
y
p
e
rb
o
li
c
(b
e
ta
)
P
re
se
n
t
b
ia
s
C
o
n
tr
o
l,
Ea
rl
y
m
e
an
2
9
.0
1
2
6
.7
2
2
5
.3
1
2
2
.9
7
3
4
.9
6
3
2
.4
1
0
.1
2
0
.0
7
0
.9
6
0
.8
2
5
.8
2
S.
E.
1
.4
3
1
.6
3
1
.4
9
1
.7
1
0
.8
5
1
.2
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
3
1
.2
1
N
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
m
e
an
2
9
.2
2
2
6
.6
5
2
5
.8
6
2
4
.4
6
3
5
.2
6
3
2
.5
7
0
.1
4
0
.0
8
0
.9
6
0
.8
3
5
.9
8
St
re
ss
,
Ea
rl
y
S.
E.
1
.4
2
1
.7
6
1
.9
1
1
.9
5
1
.1
0
1
.5
6
0
.0
5
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
0
.0
3
1
.3
5
N
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
m
e
an
2
7
.8
5
2
5
.9
5
2
4
.0
5
2
3
.0
4
3
4
.8
3
3
2
.4
7
0
.1
8
0
.0
9
0
.9
6
0
.8
0
6
.7
5
C
o
n
tr
o
l,
La
te
S.
E.
1
.6
2
1
.9
4
2
.1
0
2
.1
9
1
.1
2
1
.1
9
0
.0
4
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
0
.0
4
1
.1
6
N
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
m
e
an
2
9
.3
7
2
7
.1
1
2
5
.5
3
2
3
.7
0
3
6
.1
7
3
3
.6
9
0
.1
1
0
.0
7
0
.9
7
0
.8
2
6
.7
0
St
re
ss
,
La
te
S.
E.
1
.5
7
1
.6
5
1
.6
8
1
.7
9
0
.8
0
1
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
4
1
.3
1
N
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
St
at
is
ti
cs
St
re
ss
F
0
.3
2
8
0
.0
9
6
0
.3
1
5
0
.3
1
6
0
.7
1
5
0
.3
0
1
0
.4
2
9
0
.5
2
6
0
.1
0
6
0
.2
8
7
0
.0
0
2
p
0
.5
6
8
0
.7
5
7
0
.5
7
5
0
.5
7
5
0
.3
9
9
0
.5
8
4
0
.5
1
4
0
.4
7
0
0
.7
4
5
0
.2
9
3
0
.9
6
7
St
at
is
ti
cs
D
e
la
y
F
0
.1
1
2
0
.0
0
8
0
.1
9
5
0
.0
3
3
0
.1
6
1
0
.2
2
4
0
.1
1
6
0
.2
2
9
0
.0
0
4
0
.2
7
6
0
.4
2
8
p
0
.7
3
9
0
.9
2
7
0
.6
6
0
0
.8
5
7
0
.6
8
9
0
.6
3
6
0
.7
3
4
0
.6
3
3
0
.9
5
1
0
.6
0
0
0
.5
1
4
St
at
is
ti
cs
St
re
ss
6
D
e
la
y
F
0
.1
8
4
0
.1
2
5
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
4
8
0
.2
8
7
0
.1
8
1
1
.1
1
2
0
.6
0
4
0
.6
2
7
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
7
p
0
.6
6
9
0
.7
2
4
0
.7
9
8
0
.8
2
8
0
.5
9
3
0
.6
7
1
0
.2
9
3
0
.4
3
8
0
.4
3
0
0
.9
5
3
0
.9
3
4
In
d
iv
id
u
al
ro
w
s
re
p
o
rt
m
e
an
,
st
an
d
ar
d
e
rr
o
rs
,
an
d
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
fo
r
e
ac
h
va
ri
ab
le
,
se
p
ar
at
e
ly
fo
r
e
ac
h
o
f
th
e
fo
u
r
e
xp
e
ri
m
e
n
ta
l
co
n
d
it
io
n
s.
T
h
e
F
an
d
p
va
lu
e
s
o
f
th
e
St
re
ss
6
T
im
in
g
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
e
ff
e
ct
s
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
e
d
.
T
o
m
.=
T
o
m
o
rr
o
w
;
m
=
m
o
n
th
s
an
d
o
n
e
d
ay
.
d
o
i:1
0
.1
3
7
1
/j
o
u
rn
al
.p
o
n
e
.0
0
7
8
5
9
7
.t
0
0
1
Stress and Intertemporal Choice
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e78597
below. A maximum of 4 and a minimum of 2 subjects were tested
at the same time. In the job interview component of the task,
participants had 3 minutes each (in the case of 4 participants) to
describe why their personal qualities qualified them for a job. The
committee repeatedly interrupted the presentation with questions,
following a pre-prepared script. In the arithmetic task, participants
were asked to count backwards in steps of 16, starting at a random
4-digit number. When a mistake was made the panel told the
participant to start over. Subjects all delivered their speeches and
then performed the arithmetic task. Each subject was called at
least twice and in random order for every task, to induce a feeling
of unpredictability. Speaking time for every participant was kept
constant.
To keep the cognitive load and circumstances of the control
condition as comparable as possible, only lacking the component
of social evaluation, subjects in the control condition underwent
the same conditions, with three important differences. First,
subjects were not video- or audio- taped and there was no panel in
laboratory coats; there was just a passive observer in a corner of
the room. Second, the public speech was replaced by an account
of what would qualify a good friend for a job. The purpose of this
task was to require a similar amount of creativity and cognitive
resources as the personal job interview, while not containing the
same stressful element of social evaluation and having to ‘‘talk
oneself up’’. Finally, all subjects performed their tasks simulta-
neously with the other participants; this made the individual
contributions unintelligible to the passive observer and the other
participants, thus further reducing the social evaluative element.
Total duration of the task and speaking time for each participant
were matched to the parameters of the stress condition. When the
speaking time for each part of the control task was finished (3
minutes for the speech and 2 minutes for the arithmetic task, in
case of 4 participants), participants were asked to keep a standing
position and read neutral magazines for the remaining time.
Salivary Sampling and Biochemical Analysis
Salivary samples were obtained using Salivette sampling devices
(Sarstedt, Nu¨mbrecht, Germany) at 7 time points during the
experiments (Figure 1). Salivary samples were stored at 220uC
until further analysis. Free cortisol levels were measured using a
commercially available immunoassay (IBL, Hamburg, Germany).
Salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels were measured by a quanti-
tative enzyme kinetic essay as described elsewhere [29].
Questionnaires
Mood measurements and stress ratings were assessed shortly
before and directly after the TSST-G or control task (at t = 15 and
t = 50 min, see Figure 1). Subjects filled out the 10 negative affect
items (rated on a 5-point scale) of the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale (PANAS; [30]), resulting in a score of negative affect before
and after the TSST-G or control task. At the same time points
subjects rated how stressed they felt at that moment on a Visual
Analogue Scale (later coded as ranging from 1 to 100). To assess
impulsivity as a personality trait, subjects filled out the 30-item
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS; [31]) after the experimental tasks.
Intertemporal Choice Task
Participants performed 6 blocks of an intertemporal choice task
with varying delays, where decisions between a sooner smaller
reward and a later larger reward were offered. In the first four
blocks subjects chose between a smaller reward tomorrow, and a
larger reward in a) 3 months and 1 day, b) 6 months and 1 day, c)
9 months and 1 day, and d) 12 months and 1 day. The short delay
was set to ‘‘tomorrow’’ rather than ‘‘today’’ to keep transaction
costs the same for sooner and later payments (see below for details
on transaction costs). In the last two blocks, subjects chose between
a smaller reward in 6 months and 1 day, and a larger reward in e)
9 months and 1 day, and f) 12 months and 1 day. Each block
consisted of 7 binary choice trials, resulting in a total of 42 trials.
The larger reward was kept constant at an amount of 40 Swiss
Francs (CHF), while the sooner smaller reward started at CHF 20
and was then adjusted with a titration method according to the
choices the subject made.
Titration is a standard method for identifying time preferences
in the discounting literature [32–35]. The titration worked as
follows: for each choice of the later reward, the sooner reward was
increased by half the difference between it and 40 CHF; for
instance, if a subject chose CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day over
CHF 20 tomorrow, the next trial would offer the subject a choice
between CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day and CHF 30 tomorrow;
if the subject still chose CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day, the next
offer would be CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day vs. CHF 35
tomorrow, and so on. For each choice of the sooner reward, the
sooner reward was decreased by half of the difference between it
and the previously offered soon reward. For instance, if a subject
chose CHF 20 tomorrow over CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day,
the next trial would offer the subject a choice between CHF 10
tomorrow and CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day; if the subject
chose CHF 10 tomorrow, the next offer would be CHF 5
tomorrow vs. CHF 40 in 12 months and 1 day, and so on. The
titration procedure lasted for 7 trials at each combination of
delays; this means that each indifference point was identified to a
precision of CHF 0.156 (CHF 20 *0.5‘7; i.e. the initial difference
between CHF 20 and CHF 40/CHF 0 was halved seven times).
The amount of the sooner reward at the end of this titration
procedure was taken as the indifference point for the particular
delay combination (i.e. the amount of the sooner smaller reward
where participants switched between the smaller sooner and the
later larger reward).
Table 2. Effect of stress manipulation on time preference model parameters.
(1) Hyperbolic (k)
(2) Exponential
(delta)
(3) Quasi-hyperbolic
(delta)
(4) Quasi-hyperbolic
(beta) (5) Present-bias
(6) Discount curve
AUC
Stress 0.0151 (0.0587) 0.000774 (0.0209) 20.00438 (0.0140) 0.0165 (0.0470) 0.157 (1.815) 4.666 (23.05)
Delay 0.0527 (0.0530) 0.0186 (0.0221) 20.00687 (0.0127) 20.0203 (0.0497) 0.930 (1.676) 27.836 (24.57)
Stress6Delay 20.0797 (0.0761) 20.0230 (0.0297) 0.0149 (0.0190) 0.00411 (0.0694) 20.210 (2.521) 10.34 (33.79)
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t002
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This procedure resulted in an individual discount function for
each subject, which was used as the basis for fitting parameters of
several models of intertemporal choice. In addition, we obtained a
model-free measure of present bias. Possible serial correlation and
order effects in subjects’ responses were controlled for by
randomizing the order of trials across blocks (i.e. the order in
which the various indifference points were determined). In
addition, the side of the screen (left or right) on which the ‘‘late’’
and ‘‘soon’’ options were presented on each trial was randomized
across trials.
Note that the soonest option subjects could choose in the
intertemporal choice task was ‘‘tomorrow’’. One may ask whether
this delay can be considered small enough to be useful in
identifying present bias. We chose this design for the following
reasons: first, we found it difficult to include an earlier reward in
the design without confounding transaction costs: the chosen
option on one of the trials in the intertemporal choice task was
paid out for real (i.e., participants could pick up the chosen
amount on the chosen day of delivery, using a voucher valid at the
University cashier’s office). If the smallest delay was ‘‘today’’,
choosing this option would result in lower transaction costs
compared to choosing a more delayed option, because subjects are
already at the University, while at any other delay than today (i.e.
‘‘tomorrow’’, but also in several months) subjects may have to
travel to the University specifically to pick up their payment.
Therefore, in this case we would have been unable to dissociate
transaction costs from present bias. Second, other forms of
payment than cash vouchers proved more problematic: we judged
that getting a check or cash on the day vs. receiving a check or
cash in the mail later did not equate the perceived risk of the
transaction; bank transfers cannot be effected on the same day and
also have to be picked up at the bank before they can be
consumed; Amazon vouchers cannot be turned into consumption
immediately because of the delays associated with mail orders;
mobile phone money transfers and pre-paid debit cards are not
available in Switzerland. Thus, the ‘‘tomorrow’’ option seemed to
us the cleanest way of eliciting time preference without risk of
transaction cost confounds.
Final reimbursement consisted of a variable payment depending
on participants’ choices. In particular, as was explained to the
participants at the beginning of the study, one of all the choices
made was randomly selected at the end of the study, and the
chosen option on this trial was paid out for real (i.e., participants
could pick up the chosen amount on the chosen day of delivery,
using a voucher valid at the University cashier’s office).
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
control-early (N= 36), control-late (N= 35), stress-early (N= 35),
or stress-late (N= 36). The study was conducted between 14:00
and 20:00 in the (late) afternoon, when plasma cortisol levels are
close to the circadian trough. Participants were instructed to
refrain from smoking, eating, or drinking caffeine containing
beverages at least 2h before the study, and were asked not to
consume alcohol 24h before participating. An overview of the
study timeline is displayed in Figure 1. Subjects were instructed
not to talk to each other during the whole experiment.
Ten to fifteen minutes after subjects arrived in the laboratory, a
first saliva sample was taken. Subjects were guided to a room
Table 3. Effect of hormonal reactivity to stress on time preference model parameters in all subjects (stress and control group
pooled).
(1) Hyperbolic (k)
(2) Exponential
(delta)
(3) Quasi-
hyperbolic (delta)
(4) Quasi-
hyperbolic (beta) (5) Present-bias
(6) Discount curve
AUC
Delay 0.254*** (0.006) 0.0899** (0.011) 20.0378* (0.097) 20.101 (0.179) 3.537 (0.240) 261.01 (0.101)
Cortisol AUC 79.09 (0.114) 24.15 (0.159) 24.389 (0.691) 240.16 (0.259) 765.0 (0.540) 28429.9 (0.615)
Delay6Cortisol AUC 2123.1** (0.026) 242.44** (0.032) 13.10 (0.299) 74.38* (0.070) 22052.0 (0.165) 27309.3 (0.174)
o.Delay 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.)
Alpha-Amylase AUC 3.446 (0.344) 1.257 (0.414) 21.764 (0.159) 4.327 (0.107) 2132.8 (0.287) 21428.1 (0.481)
Delay6Alpha-Amylase
AUC
24.597 (0.326) 21.599 (0.422) 1.755 (0.245) 23.761 (0.303) 78.36 (0.632) 1539.6 (0.542)
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p,0.10,
**p,0.05,
***p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t003
Table 4. Effect of stress manipulation on indifference points in intertemporal choice task.
(1) Tom. vs. 3 m (2) Tom. vs. 6 m (3) Tom. vs. 9 m (4) Tom. vs. 12 m (5) 6 m vs. 9 m (6) 6 m vs. 12 m
Stress 0.217 (2.017) 20.0758 (2.394) 0.549 (2.421) 1.491 (2.588) 0.302 (1.394) 0.154 (1.968)
Delay 21.153 (2.157) 20.777 (2.532) 21.259 (2.576) 0.0714 (2.773) 20.131 (1.404) 0.0600 (1.695)
Stress6Delay 1.297 (3.024) 1.234 (3.495) 0.927 (3.618) 20.833 (3.832) 1.044 (1.957) 1.067 (2.512)
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t004
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where they received instructions and practice questions for the
intertemporal choice task, to be able to administer the task directly
after the stress situation without delay. Notably, subjects only
received general instructions, but were not provided with any
information about the actual rewards and delays during the
intertemporal choice task. It is therefore unlikely that they would
have decided on their choices already at this time point. When all
subjects understood the task and answered the practice questions
correctly, a second saliva sample was taken and a PANAS/VAS
questionnaire was filled out. Next, subjects received instructions
for the TSST-G or the control task, and after the 5 min
preparation period participants were guided to another room,
where they gave their speech. Before subjects were instructed to
perform the arithmetic task, a third saliva sample was taken.
Directly after the whole TSST-G or control procedure, a fourth
saliva sample was taken and a further PANAS/VAS questionnaire
was filled out. Next, participants were asked to sit at the chair
placed behind them and, depending on the experimental
condition, directly perform the intertemporal choice task on a
laptop placed before them on a table (the early groups), or fill out
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale and a socioeconomic questionnaire
and read neutral magazines (the late groups). The total delay
between the start of the TSST-G and testing of intertemporal
choice in the early groups including transportation time from one
room to another, biological measurements and filling out forms
was 35 min. 10 min and 20 min after the end of the TSST-G or
control task, the fifth and sixth saliva samples were taken, after
which subjects in the late groups performed the intertemporal
choice task (20 min after the early groups), and subjects in the
early groups filled out the questionnaires and read magazines.
After they finished, participants waited until the last saliva sample
was taken 50 min after the end of the TSST-G or control task,
after which they were debriefed and got their payment results
(depending on the choices they made during the intertemporal
decision making task), and instructions for picking up their
payment.
The choice of timing of the behavioral tasks after the stress task
was based on the following reasoning. The first time point was
selected to target non-genomic actions of corticosteroid hormones
and other rapidly acting stress hormones like noradrenaline (i.e.
immediately after the TSST). At this point in time, levels of the
stress hormones (including of (nor)adrenaline) are still high, so that
they can evoke non-genomic actions [9,10]; however, the time-
frame is too short to allow the development of gene-mediated
events. The second time point was selected such that it would just
allow the development of genomic actions. Specifically, earlier
findings in neurobiology show that genomic corticosteroid actions
are apparent after one hour, both in the hippocampus [36] and the
prefrontal cortex [22]. However, we wished to not test later than
approximately one hour after stress onset in order to be as close as
possible to the earlier time point, to avoid unwanted influences
that cannot be controlled for, such as circadian variations in
Table 5. Effect of hormonal reactivity to stress on time preference model parameters in the Stress groups.
(1) Hyperbolic (k)
(2) Exponential
(delta)
(3) Quasi-
hyperbolic (delta)
(4) Quasi-
hyperbolic (beta) (5) Present-bias
(6) Discount curve
AUC
Delay 0.291* (0.059) 0.106** (0.049) 20.0440 (0.258) 20.169 (0.208) 3.654 (0.510) 297.20* (0.097)
Cortisol AUC 103.3 (0.225) 28.34 (0.315) 26.394 (0.741) 235.22 (0.513) 2665.8 (0.699) 28161.5 (0.757)
Delay6Cortisol AUC 2147.2* (0.094) 251.56* (0.083) 12.54 (0.535) 117.2* (0.052) 21123.4 (0.574) 46016.2 (0.116)
o.Delay 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.)
Alpha-Amylase AUC 3.943 (0.422) 1.346 (0.479) 22.474 (0.191) 6.493** (0.047) 2196.1 (0.166) 21822.8 (0.481)
Delay6Alpha-Amylase
AUC
23.612 (0.527) 21.136 (0.635) 2.424 (0.270) 27.524 (0.122) 27.752 (0.970) 715.5 (0.834)
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
Each column represents an OLS regression; the dependent variable is the column title, and the independent variables are shown as rows. They include i. an indicator
variable for the delay condition (‘‘Delay’’), ii. Cortisol area under the curve for each individual subject in the Stress groups (minutes6nmol/L, divided by 1,000,000 for
ease of readability), and iii. Alpha-amylase area under the curve for each individual subject in the Stress groups. The cells show the OLS regression coefficients, betas,
which are to be interpreted such that a one-unit change in the independent variable is associated with a beta change in the dependent variable. P-values based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance of the individual coefficients: *p,0.10,
**p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t005
Table 6. Effect of stress manipulation on indifference points in intertemporal choice task for patient subjects only.
(1) Tom. vs. 3 m (2) Tom. vs. 6 m (3) Tom. vs. 9 m (4) Tom. vs. 12 m (5) 6 m vs. 9 m (6) 6 m vs. 12 m
Stress 20.596 (1.819) 20.152 (1.525) 3.184** (1.227) 1.656 (1.590) 0.378 (0.907) 0.809 (0.808)
Delay 20.448 (1.922) 0.0822 (1.579) 2.429* (1.417) 2.038 (1.936) 1.290* (0.698) 0.245 (0.780)
Stress6Delay 2.419 (2.365) 0.812 (2.111) 23.019 (1.880) 22.941 (2.522) 21.854 (1.128) 21.755 (1.223)
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p,0.10,
**p,0.05,
***p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t006
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hormone level. For this reason we tested individuals between 55
and 65 minutes after onset of the TSST.
Model Fits
For every subject and every delay level, we determined the
amount at which a subject was indifferent between the sooner and
the more delayed option, based on the individual indifference
points (see above). This allowed us to express the subjective value
of the delayed reward as a fraction of the subjective value of the
immediate reward. We then plotted the relative values of the
delayed rewards as a function of time. Next, for every subject, we
fitted three different models to the obtained indifference points.
Hyperbolic discounting model. We first fitted a standard
hyperbolic model [32,34,37–39] of the following shape:
Vt~A= 1zktð Þ ð1Þ
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t, A is the amount
of reward, t the delay until reward delivery, and k is a single
parameter describing the shape of the hyperbola. Because we
expressed the value of the delayed rewards as a fraction of the
value of the immediate reward, A= 1.
Exponential discounting model. Second, we fit a standard
exponential discount function of the following shape:
Vt~A  exp {dtð Þ ð2Þ
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t, A is the amount
of reward, t is the delay until reward delivery, and d is the
parameter describing the steepness of the exponential discount
function. Because we expressed the value of the delayed rewards as
a fraction of the value of the immediate reward, A= 1.
Beta-delta quasi-hyperbolic discount model. Laibson’s
beta-delta model [2] was fitted to the indifference points to obtain
an estimate of the degree of impatience and present bias:
Vt~v rtð Þzb
XT{t
t~1
dtv rtztð Þ: ð3Þ
where Vt indicates the discounted value at time t of a stream of
rewards r with subjective values v as a function of time t. This
equation contains a constant, exponential discount function whose
discount rate is log (1/d), thus whose steepness can be character-
ized by d. The b parameter deflects the exponential discount curve
and its inverse can be interpreted as the extra weight added to
immediate rewards. Hence, d can be interpreted as measuring
impatience and b as measuring present bias.
The data were better described by Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic
model than the standard hyperbolic discounting model or the
standard exponential model (Akaike Information Criteria, adjust-
ing for the number of parameters: Laibson model, 211.22;
hyperbolic model, 29.57; exponential model, 28.86).
Model-free measure of delay discounting. To obtain a
model-free summary measure of discounting behavior, we
computed the area under the curve (AUC) under the discount
function. This was achieved by simply computing the area of each
trapezoid described by adjacent pairs of indifference points and
the line y= 0, and summing the areas, individually for each
participant.
Model-free measure of present bias. Finally, to obtain a
model-free measure of present bias, we proceeded as follows:
present-biased subjects are those whose discounting over a given
period is greater when that period is in the near future compared
to when it is in the more distant future. In our design, a present-
biased subject would discount more between tomorrow and 3
months and 1 day than between 3 months and 1 day and 6 months
and 1 day; similarly, they would discount more between tomorrow
and 6 months and 1 day than between 6 months and 1 day and 12
months and 1 day. We used this feature of our experimental design
to obtain a model-free measure of present bias, without
assumptions about the shape of the discount function, but
Table 7. Effect of stress manipulation on indifference points in intertemporal choice task for impatient subjects only.
(1) Tom. vs. 3 m (2) Tom. vs. 6 m (3) Tom. vs. 9 m (4) Tom. vs. 12 m (5) 6 m vs. 9 m (6) 6 m vs. 12 m
Stress 0.104 (2.551) 21.238 (2.811) 23.271 (2.859) 20.0474 (2.948) 20.257 (2.277) 21.293 (3.092)
Delay 22.874 (2.489) 22.930 (2.941) 26.194** (2.881) 23.375 (2.657) 22.114 (2.087) 20.889 (2.427)
Stress6Delay 1.492 (3.730) 3.392 (4.017) 6.644* (3.818) 3.252 (4.016) 4.680 (3.159) 4.961 (3.894)
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p,0.10,
**p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t007
Table 8. Effect of stress manipulation on patient responding in intertemporal choice task.
(1) Tom. vs. 3 m (2) Tom. vs. 6 m (3) Tom. vs. 9 m (4) Tom. vs. 12 m (5) 6 m vs. 9 m (6) 6 m vs. 12 m
Stress 20.0321 (0.0402) 20.00703 (0.0503) 0.0431 (0.0504) 0.0336 (0.0489) 0.0118 (0.0565) 0.0142 (0.0580)
Delay 20.0158 (0.0407) 20.0111 (0.0474) 0.0757 (0.0498) 0.0785 (0.0541) 20.00454 (0.0546) 20.0185 (0.0573)
Stress6Delay 0.0399 (0.0600) 0.0340 (0.0698) 20.0434 (0.0724) 20.112 (0.0749) 0.0126 (0.0777) 0.00828 (0.0799)
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t008
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computing the difference between their ‘‘tomorrow vs. 3 months
and 1 days’’ indifference point and the ‘‘6 months and 1 day vs. 9
months and 1 day’’ indifference points from the intertemporal
choice task; similarly, we computed the difference between their
‘‘tomorrow vs. 6 months and 1 days’’ indifference point and the ‘‘6
months and 1 day vs. 12 months and 1 day’’ indifference points.
The average of these two differences is a model-free measure of
present bias.
Statistical Analysis
All measures that showed a skewed distribution with the
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (cortisol, sAA, PANAS and VAS
measurements) were log-transformed and further Analyses of
Variance (ANOVAs) were performed on the transformed data.
Hormone measurements were analyzed using a 7 (Sample Period:
t0 vs. t15 vs. t40 vs. t50 vs. t60 vs. t70 vs. t100)62 (Stress: TSST-
G vs. Control)62 (Delay: Early vs. Late) General Linear Model
(GLM) repeated measures ANOVA with Sample Period as a
repeated measure. Subjective affect and stress measures were
analyzed using a 2 (Sample Period: pre vs. post)62 (Stress: TSST-
G vs. Control)62 (Delay: Early vs. Late) General Linear Model
(GLM) repeated measures ANOVA with Sample Period as a
repeated measure.
For our main analysis, effects of stress and timing on the
indifference points of the intertemporal choice task were analyzed
by a 6 (Indifference Point)6 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs. Control)6 2
(Delay: Early vs. Late) General Linear Model (GLM) repeated
measures ANOVA with Indifference Points as a repeated measure.
Next, effects of stress and timing were analyzed on each
indifference point separately and on the model parameters with
a 2 (Stress: TSST-G vs. Control) 6 2 (Delay: Early vs. Late)
ANOVA.
The relationship between hormone increases and stress-induced
changes in discount parameters was assessed by OLS regression of
model parameters on area under the curve for cortisol and sAA
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Specifically, we
used the following specification:
yi~b0zb1
:delayizb2
:cortizb3
:aai
zb4
:corti|delayizb5
:aai|delayizui,
where yi is any model fit parameter from the intertemporal choice
task, corti and aai are the area under the curve measures for cortisol
and alpha-amylase, respectively, and the remaining variables are
as above. This regression was run only on subjects in the stress
groups.
Results
Stress Induction
The experimental groups did not differ on any of the measured
baseline variables (cortisol, PANAS and VAS; all p’s .0.40). As
expected, the ANOVA for cortisol showed a significant Sample
Period 6 Stress interaction (Figure 1a, F6,816 = 68.23, p,0.001).
Furthermore, a main effect of Sample Period (F6,816 = 68.23,
p,0.001) and a main effect of Stress (F1,136 = 2925.19, p,0.001)
were found. Planned simple contrasts related to baseline showed
that subjects in the stress condition had increased cortisol levels
from the sample taken during the TSST-G (t40) until t90 (i.e. at
the end of the session; all p’s ,0.001).
For sAA, a significant Sample Period 6 Stress interaction
(Figure 1b, F6,804 = 18.36, p,0.001) and a significant main effect
of Sample Period (F6,804 = 35.00, p,0.001) were found. Planned
simple contrasts compared to baseline showed that sAA levels were
increased in the stress condition from t40 (i.e. during the TSST-G)
until after the TSST-G at t50 (p’s ,0.05). Thus, the stress
manipulation worked as intended, significantly raising both
cortisol and alpha-amylase levels over time. Negative affect
(PANAS; F1,137 = 15.60, p,0.001) as well as subjective stress
ratings (VAS; F1,137 = 15.82, p,0.001) both increased in the stress
group compared to the control group immediately after the stress
task compared to baseline. As expected, no effects of Delay (Early
vs. Late groups) were found on the stress induction measurements.
Intertemporal Choice Performance
To assess the effect of stress on intertemporal choice, we first
obtained indifference points for each of the six delay combinations
used. We then fit the discounting data with three standard models,
as described above: the standard hyperbolic model, the standard
exponential model, and Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic model. In the
standard hyperbolic model, higher k implies greater discounting,
and in the exponential model, larger rho implies greater
discounting. Laibsons’ model distinguishes present bias from
impatience: whereas the latter refers to the degree of discounting
of future outcomes as a function of time, the former refers to extra
value placed on short-term outcomes [2]. Present bias is
characterized by the beta parameter, and impatience by the delta
parameter. Strong present bias and strong impatience are
associated with low betas and high deltas, respectively (see
Materials and Methods).
The overall ANOVA on the 6 indifference points did not show a
Stress6Delay interaction effect (F1,138 = 0.090, n.s.), nor a main
effect of either Stress (F1,138 = 0.402, n.s.) or Delay (F1,138 = 0.011,
n.s.) or any interaction effects with Indifference Point (all F’s
,0.55, n.s.). ANOVAs on each indifference point individually also
revealed that neither Stress, Delay nor the interaction between
Stress and Delay influenced the indifference points in the
intertemporal choice task (all F’s ,0.71, n.s.) or discounting model
fit parameters (all F’s ,1.11, n.s.). Table 1 reports the descriptives
and summary statistics for the indifference points and the time
preference model parameters that were assessed. Thus, we found
no evidence that stress affects intertemporal choice in our study.
The model-free measure of discounting (i.e. the area under the
curve of the discount function) was also not affected by stress;
column 6 in Table 2 shows that there was neither a main effect of
stress or delay, nor an interaction effect.
We repeated the regression analysis of the discount parameters
using cortisol or alpha-amylase area under the curve as
independent variables using all subjects, not only those in the
stress group. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.
They reveal that subjects with higher cortisol or sAA area under
Table 9. Effect of stress on inconsistent responses in time
preference task.
Inconsistent
Stress 0.0764 (0.183)
Delay 0.0407 (0.421)
Stress6Delay 20.0962 (0.198)
Observations 142
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078597.t009
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the curve showed no differential discounting behavior. We did find
an effect of delay- that is subjects in the delayed condition
discounted more than others. This effect was attenuated in subjects
with strong responses to the TSST. The results of the OLS
regression analyses are summarized in tables 2–9.
One possible explanation for the lack of an effect of stress on
discounting observed here is that subjects’ responses in the
discounting task may have been at floor or ceiling. To address
this concern, first note from the minimum and maximum discount
parameters reported in Table 10 that subjects in fact exhibited a
broad range of discount behavior, making this alternative account
prima facie unlikely. To address the concern more explicitly, we
repeated our main analysis separately for patient vs. impatient
subjects. Specifically, we performed a median split on the mean of
the six indifference points for each subjects, and then regressed the
indifference points of each of these groups individually on the
stress and delay indicator variables. The results are reported in
Tables 6 and 7. They are not qualitatively or quantitatively
different from our main findings (i.e. neither patient nor impatient
participants exhibited an effect of stress on discounting).
Null-results are difficult to interpret since the lack of significance
can be due to a lack of effect, or due to an insufficiently small
sample size and thus insufficient power. To this end, we conducted
a power analysis using G-Power [40]. The power analysis revealed
that a group size of 142 subjects should have been sufficient to
detect even small effects sizes of 0.2 standard deviations with a
power of 0.8. Thus, although our results provide no ultimate
evidence for the absence of effect, it is unlikely that the lack of
significance is due to insufficient statistical power.
We next asked whether individual differences in stress
responsivity might obscure any effects of our stress manipulation
on discounting behavior. To answer this question, we regressed the
model parameters on individual cortisol and alpha-amylase stress
reactivity, for the stress group only, with an interaction term for
delay (see Table 5). We found a weakly significant positive
relationship between stress-induced alpha-amylase increases and
beta. Thus, in strong alpha-amylase stress responders, stress may
decrease present bias somewhat; conversely, people with blunted
stress responses would exhibit stress-induced increases in present
bias. Overall, however, we observed no significant effects of stress
and timing of stress on intertemporal choice.
To further investigate the possibility that stress may have
affected the path individual participants took to reach the
indifference point, we conducted an additional analysis in which
we did not use the indifference points, but the proportion of
patient responses of each participant as the outcome variable,
taking into account all responses of each participant from the first
choice situation until an indifference point was reached. The
results are reported in Table 8. Again none of the coefficients was
significant, suggesting that when the proportion of patient
responses is used as the outcome variable instead of the
indifference points, the results do not change. A possible confound
to our results is that subjects’ responses to the time preference
questions may be inconsistent, and that this inconsistency may be
affected by stress. This is an important concern, since it has been
shown that, for example, the effect of working memory load on
discounting can be explained by increased randomness in
responses under higher working memory load, rather than truly
different time preferences [41,42]. In principle, this mechanism
could underlie our results as well, in that it might obscure any
effects of stress on intertemporal choice.
To assess whether our subjects showed inconsistent responses in
the time preference task, and whether these responses were
affected by stress, we analyzed whether our subjects showed non-
monotonic discount functions, - that is whether any indifference
point identified by our titration algorithm at a particular delay was
lower than any indifference point at a later delay (e.g., we identified
indifference points as inconsistent if a subject was indifferent
between 20 CHF in one day and 40 CHF in 6 months, and 30
CHF in one day and 40 CHF in 9 months). Note that our
experimental design did not make it possible for subjects to give
inconsistent responses when identifying any particular indifference
point, since the indifference points were approximated by a
titration algorithm. Thus, any given indifference point, by the
nature of the algorithm, was obtained through choices that were
‘‘consistent’’ by definition. However, mistakes that subject made
during the titration would manifest themselves in inconsistencies
between indifference points; this is what we analyzed in the
following.
Overall, 20.77% of indifference points showed evidence of
inconsistency. However, the proportion of inconsistent responses
for a particular subject was not dependent on whether this subject
was in the stress or control, or early or late conditions. In an OLS
regression with the percentage of inconsistent indifference points
as the dependent variable, and stress and delay, and their
interaction, as the independent variables, no coefficient was
significant (Stress: beta = 0.0764, p = 0.183; Delay: beta = 0.0407,
p = 0.421; Stress6Delay: beta =20.0962, p = 0.198). Thus, stress
does not appear to have affected response consistency in the
intertemporal choice task.
Note that we used consistency here to refer to noise in the
respondent’s choices, rather than to preference reversals or
hyperbolic discounting. We deem a set of indifference points
inconsistent if at least one indifference point is higher than another
indifference point from the same set that corresponds to a shorter
time horizon. For instance, a set of indifference points would be
considered inconsistent if CHF 40 were discounted to CHF 30
over 3 months, but to CHF 35 over 6 months. Importantly,
because the slope of such a discount function is positive over some
interval, this sense of inconsistency is distinct from hyperbolic
discounting, which implies a negative slope over the entire support
of the discount function. This sense of inconsistency is therefore
not captured by models of hyperbolic discounting or time
inconsistency, such as Laibson’s beta-delta model [2] or Takaha-
shi’s q-exponential discounting [43].
As an alternative measure of choice consistency, it might be
tempting to turn to the rate of convergence of the titration
procedure. However, this rate of convergence cannot be
distinguished from preference, and therefore cannot serve as a
measure of choice consistency: if a participant has a defined
indifference point for a given pair of delays, then there is only one
path through the titration procedure that leads to that indifference
point. The rate at which the procedure’s current best estimate of
the indifference point changes is therefore determined by the
distance of the participant’s true indifference point from the
starting point of the titration procedure. As an example, suppose a
subject is presented with a choice of CHF 20 tomorrow vs. CHF
40 in 3 months at the beginning of the titration procedure; assume
further that their true indifference point for this pair of delays is
CHF 30. The 6 trials of the procedure allow the participant to
approximate their true indifference point up to +/215 cents. If the
participant does this, the procedure will converge at an average
rate of CHF 10/6=CHF 1.67 per trial. In contrast, if their true
indifference point were CHF 38, the procedure would converge at
a rate of CHF 3 per trial. Thus, the rate of convergence is a
function of the distance of the indifference point from the starting
point of the titration procedure, and can therefore not be used as
an estimate of choice consistency. Put differently, the titration
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procedure takes each decision by the participant at face value and
ignores the fact that some of these decisions may be affected by
noise. This will lead to noisily estimated indifference points;
however, as shown in Table 9, we can estimate the degree of noise
in the indifference points, and find that it is not affected by
experimental condition.
Discussion
We here investigated the effect of stress on intertemporal choice.
We had hypothesized, based on theory and evidence from
behavioral economics and cellular neuroscience, that immediately
after stress subjects would exhibit an increased propensity to
choose smaller-sooner over larger-later payoffs, whereas we
predicted the opposite result when subjects were tested 20 minutes
after the end of the stress test. Recent evidence from cellular and
behavioral neuroscience suggests that shortly after stress, individ-
uals turn to simple behavioral strategies. For instance, humans
exposed to a psychosocial stressor use a simpler (striatal) stimulus-
response rather than a more complex spatial learning strategy
[44]. Individuals also shift from goal-directed to habitual control in
instrumental behavior shortly after stress [16]. Underlying
biological mechanisms of these rapid stress effects are thought to
involve both catecholamines and corticosteroid hormones
[7,8,16,44,45], the latter probably accomplishing non-genomic
actions [9]. Conversely, recent evidence suggests that the later
effects of stress may serve the function of normalizing the stress
response and preparing the organism for the future [8,24,25];
consistent with this view is the finding that slow genomic
corticosteroid effects improve spatial memory formation in mice
[23] and e.g. contextualization of emotional information and
working memory in humans [25,46].
However, our results show no evidence for an effect of stress on
intertemporal choice at either time point, suggesting that
intertemporal choice may in general not be affected by psycho-
social laboratory-induced stress. We also found no evidence that
stress-induced changes in hormone levels (cortisol and alpha-
amylase) correlate with individual differences in intertemporal
choice, suggesting that these stress responses may not substantially
contribute to the observed intertemporal choice behavior.
Our findings contrast sharply with a growing body of recent
evidence suggesting that stress may affect decision-making. Keinan
[47] found that subjects were impaired in a verbal analogy task
when they were threatened with uncontrollable compared to
controllable electric shocks. Gray [48] found that subjects made
suboptimal decisions in a temporally extended choice task when
the task was presented in a negative emotional compared to a
neutral context. Van den Bos et al. [49] and Preston et al. [50]
reported that performance on the Iowa Gambling Task was
impaired under stress, particularly in men. Finally, Porcelli &
Delgado [51] induced stress using the cold-pressor task [52], in
which subjects immerse their hand in ice-cold water, and found
that this stress induction increased the reflection effect in risky
decision-making: stressed subjects showed stronger risk aversion in
the domain of gains, and stronger risk seeking in the loss domain.
Although timing was not specifically addressed in any of these
studies, the design was such that rapid rather than delayed effects
of stress were targeted. Our study sought to extend these previous
findings on risky choice into the intertemporal domain. However,
we did not find any effects of stress on intertemporal choice,
independent of the timing of choice relative to stress onset. This
finding does not support the view that stress strongly affects all
domains of decision-making; instead it suggests that some aspects
of decision-making may be susceptible to the effects of stress, while
others may not.
An alternative explanation for the found null-results might be
an interaction between an increased preference for more
immediate rewards and a stress induced reduction in reward
responsiveness [53–55]. A general decrease in hedonic or
motivational value of rewards could manifest in increased choice
for delayed reinforcers, provided that temporal discounting is not
constant and reward to utility mapping is not linear, but follows a
concave utility function [56,57]. A decrease in reward responsive-
ness might therefore have counteracted increased present bias
directly after stress induction. Speculatively, a similar interaction
occurring in the late condition, leading to zero net effects, possibly
indicates that a longer timeframe is necessary to dissociate early
versus late effects of stress on inter-temporal decision making.
Of course, when understanding how stress affects decision
making it is important to keep in mind that there are individual
differences in reactivity to social stress. For example, social stress
can either lead to ‘‘challenging states’’, when individuals believe
they have the personal resources to cope, or ‘‘threat states’’, when
situational demands are perceived to outweigh resources [58].
These individual differences in responses to stress might explain
part of the somewhat inconsistent data on stress effects on decision
making. One recent study [59] investigated the role of anticipatory
stress on delay discounting, and found that trait perceived stress
and the orientation of the stress task (present-oriented vs. future-
oriented speech) interact with stress to affect delay discounting.
These factors were not investigated in the current study and may
partly explain the lack of effects.
A further possibility as to how our null finding may be explained
rests in the particular paradigms used here, in particular the use of
the TSST to induce psychosocial stress, and the titration
procedure to obtain discount parameters. For instance, it is
conceivable that the stress condition of the TSST, in which
participants find themselves under close scrutiny by a panel of
intimidating judges, leads participants to behave in a ‘‘more
desirable’’ fashion; in the context of a discounting task, this might
lead to more patient responding than would otherwise result from
being stressed. Similarly, the abstract nature of our time
discounting task may not be adequate for picking up an effect of
stress on impulsive responding, which may be better captured with
a task that allows for ‘‘hot’’ responses. Future work might therefore
attempt to use stress induction methods which do not put
participants under social pressure, such as the Cold Pressor task;
and discounting paradigms which better capture impulsive
responding than the present titration task.
Furthermore, in the current study the titration procedure of the
intertemporal choice task might have triggered response strategies
and limited the assessment of effects of stress on choice
consistency. In addition, the different delays of reward choices
were limited, with the soonest reward delay being tomorrow rather
than today. Having the soonest reward tomorrow instead of today
could in particular have weakened the effect of stress on the
measure of present bias. Further studies with random choices, as
well as immediately available reward options, are necessary to
shed light on these issues.
It remains possible that particular aspects of our experimental
design were the source of the lack of an effect of stress on choices.
The studies discussed before tested both men and women, and two
of them [49,50] found clear gender differences. In our study only
male subjects were tested, which limits our conclusion that
psychosocial stress does not affect intertemporal choice only to
male subjects. Regarding the timing of the stressor, it should be
mentioned that the late group was tested on the intertemporal
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choice task at a time point where presumable genomic cortisol
effects are just starting to develop. Based on animal studies, these
genomic effects start to develop 55–65 minutes after the onset of
stress [17,18], which is the exact time interval after which the
intertemporal choice task is given. Since it is not known if genomic
effects need a comparable time to develop in humans, and cortisol
might take longer to reach elevated levels after stress, we cannot
exclude that genomic effects might not have fully developed when
testing the late group. Moreover, cortisol levels were still elevated
in the late group during the intertemporal choice task, so non-
genomic actions might also have played a role here, therefore
precluding a clear distinction between genomic and non-genomic
actions of cortisol in the ‘‘late’’ group. Future studies may need to
explore different time scales, varying the delay between stress onset
and the task, as well as reward delays within the intertemporal
choice task, to fully understand the complexity of the effects of
stress and stress hormones on intertemporal choice.
In conclusion, while previous studies have shown that decision-
making is strongly susceptible to environmental and somatic
factors, such as individuals’ responses to stress and variations in
hormonal balance, the present study suggests instead that some
aspects of decision-making may be more stable than suggested by
this literature.
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